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NOTES
Cooper v. Union Bank: Common Law
Survives the UCC
During the period of approximately a year and a half, Bernice Ruff, a
secretary and bookkeeper of a law firm, falsely appropriated a number of
checks payable to the order of her employer and forged the necessary indorsements thereon. She cashed some of the checks and deposited the remainder to her personal account, but subsequently withdrew the entire
amount of the deposits prior -to the discovery of the forgeries. The employer
brought an action in conversion under the Uniform Commerical Code section 3-419' against the collecting banks to recover the amounts of the forged
checks which they had handled. 2 The collecting banks successfully defended the action on the basis of section 3-419(3), which, under certain
circumstances, limits liability to the proceeds remaining in the banks' hands
when the bank has acted in good faith and in accordance with a reasonable
commercial standard. The lower court held that the defendant banks had
acted in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards, and that since all checks had been cashed or -deposited and subsequently withdrawn, the banks had -no proceeds remaining in their hands. Therefore, in accordance with section 3-419(3), the lower court held that the defendant banks did not hold funds which could be recovered by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff-employer appealed. Held, reversed: Uniform Commercial
Code section 3-419(3) is inapplicable in a suit by a true ower (payee)
against a bank which has converted a forged check. In contrast to the lower
court's view, a collecting bank does not part with -the proceeds of a check
when it cashes and pays the check on a forged indorsement. The collecting
bank, therefore, does have funds that a plaintiff may recover. Cooper v.
Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 123, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
I.

PRE-CODE COMMON LAW

The majority of cases litigated prior to the promulgation and adoption of
the Uniform Commercial Code supported the rule that a collecting bank
which honors a check with a forged or unauthorized indorsement and pro1. CALIF. COMM. CODE § 3419 (West 1964).
2. Suit was also brought against two of the payor banks, but they were absolved
from liability on the common law defense of plaintiff's negligence in failing to discover
the misappropriations. This defense is based on the theory that a reasonably prudent
man would have discovered the wrongdoing after a period of time and failure to do
so constitutes negligence. The trial court set this period of time at approximately six
months. The particular checks drawn on the defendant payor banks were handled after
this point. The defense of plaintiff's negligence was also available to the collecting
banks, but the court found that seven of the twenty-nine checks were cashed prior to
this date, i.e., before the plaintiff was negligent. Since the collecting banks had no
common law defense to an action brought for these seven checks, they attempted to
invoke the statutory defense of § 3-419(3).
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cures the proceeds thereof from the drawee is liable to the true owner of
the check, unless he is barred from recovery by negligence, laches, or estoppel.3 The courts have allowed recovery in both tort and contract, but regardless of which theory was utilized the end result has been consistent with
this rule. 4 The court in Jackson v. National Bank,5 after enunciating the
principle that a bank is responsible to the named payee when it pays on
a forged indorsement, explained that:
No equitable considerations can be invoked to soften seeming
hardships in the enforcement of the laws and rules fixing liability
on persons handling commercial paper. These laws are the
growth of ages, and the result of experience, having their origin
in necessity. The inflexibility in these rules may occasionally
make them seem severe, but in them is found general security.6
In Buena Vista Oil Co. v. Park Bank 7 an oil company's secretary secured
possession of a check made payable to the corporation and, using a rubber
stamp, indorsed the corporation's name on the check, signing his own name
as secretary. The secretary deposited the check in his own bank and the
bank credited it to his personal account. When the corporation discovered
-the loss, it brought suit against the collecting bank which had collected the
amount of the check from the drawee bank. Although the employee later
made withdrawals from his account, the court held the bank liable -to the
corporation for the full amount of the check for money had and received.8
Most of the pre-Code cases were decided upon the rationale that a forged
or unauthorized indorsement is wholly inoperative to pass ownership of the
check, and, therefore, a collecting bank cashing a forged check does not acquire ownership by virtue of its possession. 9 Nor is a claim to ownership
aided by describing the transaction as a purchase with consideration paid,
since the payee remains the true owner. 10 Thus, when the collecting bank
3. See, e.g., Washington Mechanics Say. Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F.2d
827 (D.C. Cir. 1933); Merchants Bank v. National Capitol Press, 288 F. 265 (D.C.
Cir. 1922); Saf-T-Boom Corp. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 236 Ark. 518, 367 S.W.2d 116
(1963); Morgan v. Morgan, 220 Cal. App. 2d 665, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1963); Buena
Vista Oil Co. v. Park Bank, 39 Cal. App. 710, 180 P. 12 (1919). See also Annot.,
100 A.L.R.2d 670 (1965).
4. Proceeding on a theory of money had and received, the court in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Fort Worth Nat'l Bank, 65 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933),
judgment adopted, stated that a collecting bank which accepts a check on an unauthorized indorsement acquires no title thereto and, upon collection from the drawee bank,
holds the proceeds for the rightful owner who may recover from the collecting bank
in an action for money had and received. Compare this to the court's argument in
Zidek v. Forbes Nat'l Bank, 159 Pa. Super. 442, 48 A.2d 103, 104 (1946): "[W]here
a bank receives a check bearing the forged indorsement of the payee, collects it and
accounts for it to the depositor (not the payee) it is guilty of conversion for which
it is liable directly to the payee ... .
5. 92 Tenn. 154, 20 S.W. 802 (1893).
6. 20 S.W. at 803.
7. 39 Cal. App. 710, 180 P. 12 (1919).
8. 180 P. at 15.
9. Washington Mechanics Say. Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1933); Walsh v. American Trust Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 654, 47 P.2d 323 (1935);
see Kessler, Forged Indorsements, 47 YALE L.J. 863 (1938).
10. Washington Mechanics Say. Bank v. District Title Ins. Co., 65 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1933); Lindsley v. First Nat'l Bank, 327 Pa. 393, 190 A. 876 (1937).
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submits the check to the drawee for collection, the money it receives is held
for the true owner and can be recovered in an action at law. 1
The forged indorsement which is inoperative to convey title to the collecting bank is also inoperative as a proper order on the drawee to pay out
the drawer's funds. Thus, in Morgan v. Morgan'2 the collecting bank
argued that the money it received from the drawee on a forged check was
the drawee bank's own money and not the proceeds from the check. The
consequent argument was that the collecting bank held no funds on account
for the payee. The court found the collecting bank liable on the general
bank collection theory of ratification.'8 According to this principle, the true
owner, in bringing an action against the collecting bank, is deemed to have
ratified the collection of the proceeds from the payor bank. This ratification
transforms the former remittance of funds by the payor bank into an authorized act for which it may debit the drawer's account. Thus, the collecting
bank is deemed ,to have received the proceeds of the check. Ratification
of the collection, however, does not ratify the forgery or delivery of the proceeds to the wrong person. Hence, the payee may treat the collection as
one for his own use and benefit.
The pre-Code law did not, however, leave the collecting banks absolutely
liable. Common law provided the defenses of negligence, laches, and estoppel.14 The practical result is that although the collecting bank does not
acquire the ownership of the check or its proceeds, the true owner will be
denied recovery if his actions could have prevented the forgery or prevented
continued unauthorized indorsements.' 5 While two of these defenses are
legal in form, all were applied under equitable considerations.'
While
equities generally favor the true owner as against the collecting bank that
handles a forged instrument,' 7 the equities shift in favor of the bank when
such forgery could have been prevented had it not been for the negligence
of the true owner. Where these common law defenses are inapplicable, the
true owner is entitled to full recovery from the collecting bank which
handled the check.' 8
II.

THE IMPACT OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SECTION

3-419

The common law causes of action available to the true owner of a forged
11. Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 303 N.Y. 27, 100 N.E.2d 117, 120
(1951).
12. 220 Cal. App. 2d 665, 34 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1963).
13. Id. See also Jones v. Bank of America, 49 Cal. App. 2d 115, 121 P.2d 94
(1942); Independent Oil Men's Ass'n v. Fort Dearborn Nat'l Bank, 311 Ill. 278, 142
N.E. 458 (1924); 8 CAL. JuR. 2D REV. § 273 (1968).
14. R. Mars, The Contract Co. v. Massanutten Bank, 285 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.
1960); Saf-T-Boom Corp. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 236 Ark. 518, 367 S.W.2d 116 (1963);
People v. Bank of North America, 75 N.Y. 547 (1879). See also Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d
638 ('1963).

15. Where the indorsor had apparent authority, the court in Walsh v. American

Trust Co., 7 Cal. App. 2d 654, 47 P.2d 323, 325 (1935), stated: "A person whose
check was indorsed without authority may be estopped to deny such want of authority

by his negligence in allowing another to clothe himself or be clothed with apparent
authority to so indorse."
16. Kessler, supra note 9, at 868.
17. Id.

18. See note 2 supra.
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check were codified under UCC section 3-419 as an action in conversion.
While the statute broadened the remedies available in some jurisdictions, 19
the statute also provided a poorly worded defense in subsection (3) which
appears to alter the common law by introducing a new defense heretofore
unknown in the payee's suit against a collecting bank for conversion. As
previously noted, a collecting bank's defenses were limited to negligence,
laches, or estoppel. 20 Subsection (3) provides that:
Subject to the provisions of this code concerning restrictive indorsements a representative, including a depositary or collecting
bank, who has in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable
commercial standards applicable to the business of such representative dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one
who was not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner
21 beyond the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
Thus, this section seems to relieve a depositary or collecting bank of liability if the bank complies with the statutory standard-a radical departure
from the prevailing common law.
Subsection (3) focuses on three elements: (a) acting in good faith, (b)
acting in accordance with reasonable commercial standards applicable to the
business, and (c) holding proceeds from the converted instrument. The section is applicable to representatives, including depositary or collecting banks.
Litigation of section 3-419 has been limited and courts have handled subsection (3) in different ways. Some courts have merely ignored the subsection. 22 Others have avoided a direct interpretation of subsection (3) by
holding that the collecting bank did not qualify for its use. In Belmar
Trucking Corp. v. American Trust Co. 23 the issue was whether a collecting
bank was liable to a corporate payee of a check for its face amount where
they had cashed the check on a forged indorsement. The bank raised section 3-419(3) as a defense. Apparently the bank acted in good faith, but the
issue was whether it had acted in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards applicable to its business. The court held that the bank had not
met this standard, and, therefore, the defense was not available and the
24
bank was liable in conversion.
19. CALIF. COMM. CODE § 3419, comment 3 (West 19'64) explains:
Subdivision (1)(C) is new statutory law and reverses the rule in California. Under the NIL, there was a split of authority on whether the
drawee bank paying on a forged indorsement is liable to the holder whose
indorsement was forged. In those jurisdictions which gave the payee a
right of action against the drawee bank, the theory was upon constructive acceptance or conversion . . . California adopted the rule that the

drawee in this situation was not liable upon the ground that there was no
privity.
Thus, in states like California, the payee may now proceed directly against the drawee
bank with an action for conversion.
20. See note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419(3).
22. See, e.g., Salsman v. National Community Bank, 102 N.J. Super. 482, 246

A.2d 162 (1968).
23.

65 Misc. 2d 31, 316 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1970).

24. 316 N.Y.S.2d at 254.

See also White Lumber Co. v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l

Bank, 253 Cal. App. 2d 368, 61 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1967).
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Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. 25 is the first case that actually interpreted subsection (3). The Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. had acted in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. Since the
initial qualifications to raise the defense were met, it was necessary for the
court to consider the previously unadjudicated question of whether a collecting bank which cashed a forged check is acting as a representative within
the meaning of the statute. The court held that a collecting bank cashing
a forged check is not acting in a representative capacity to the true owner.
Consequently, subsection (3) which only applies to a representative was
by the true owner against the
held to be unavailable as a defense in a suit
26
collecting bank for conversion of his check.
The Uniform Commercial Code comment, however, indicates that subsection (3) is intended to adopt the rule of decisions which hold that a representative that deals with a negotiable instrument in good faith is not liable
in conversion. 27 Ervin suggests that the line of cases codified by subsection
(3) deal with a true agent-principal relationship, as in First National Bank
v. Goldberg,28 where an attorney in good faith assisted his client in the sale
of bonds that were subsequently found to have been stolen. 29 Hence, the
court in Ervin defused the subsection (3) defense by its interpretation of
the term representative. Rendering the entire subsection ,(3) defense inapplicable to a collecting bank which had cashed a forged check, the court
did not develop an analysis of the other statutory terms. In particular, the
term "proceeds" was yet to be explained by judicial decision.
III. COOPER V. UNION BANK
In Cooper v. Union Bank3 0 the court, as in Ervin, was also faced with
a bank that had acted in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable
commercial standards applicable to the business of banking. Accordingly,
the bank had fulfilled the initial prerequisites for raising the section 3-419(3)
defense. The court in Cooper, however, reached its decision by pursuThe court initially
ing a careful analysis of the statutory term "proceeds."''1
faced two issues: first, whether the collecting banks had received any pro-

ceeds, and second, if the banks had received proceeds, whether they had
parted with any proceeds received. 32 It was reasoned that the proceeds of
a check originate in the drawer's account with the payor bank, and, therefore, the collecting bank has no proceeds unless the payor bank forwards

them.3 3 The court distinguished between forwarding the proceeds and forwarding the amount of the forged instrument. Because the payor bank can
25. 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 311 (1965).
26. 3 UCC Rep. Serv. at 317-18.
27. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419, comment 5.
28. 340 Pa. 337, 17 A.2d 377 (1941).
29. See also Gruntal v. National Sur. Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682 (1930).
30. 9 Cal. 3d 123, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
31. 507 P.2d at 613, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 5. It must be noted that the decision is
limited to collecting banks. The court found it unnecessary to undertake an analysis
of § 3-419,(3) for payor banks. See note 2 supra.
32. 507 P.2d at 613, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
33. Id.
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only debit the customer's account upon a valid instrument,8 4 any amounts
a payor bank remits to the collecting bank upon a forged instrument must
necessarily be from the bank's own funds and not the proceeds of the check.
At this point, 'the collecting bank has no proceeds and, thus, assuming UCC
section 3-419(3) is applicable, no attachable funds under the Code. The
payor bank's funds formerly remitted to the collecting bank on the forged
instrument may, however, be legally changed into the proceeds by use of
the common law theory of ratification."8 This occurs when the true owner,
in bringing an action against the collecting bank for conversion of a check
collected on a forged indorsement,8 6 transforms the remittance of bank funds
37
by the payor bank into an authorized debit of the drawer's account.
Having thus determined that the collecting bank did hold proceeds of the
forged checks, the court next considered whether the collecting bank had
paid out any of these proceeds. 8s When the forged checks were initially
cashed, the bank could pay over the counter only its own funds, since it
had not yet submitted the check to the payor bank. The court stated that
upon collection of the instrument, the proceeds became mingled with the
banks general funds and were, therefore, retained by the bank for the true
owner. This conclusion was reached by analogy to the general law of constructive trusts. 39 It seems that another court more disposed to the letter
of the UCC could reason that the cash paid over the counter when the
forged instruments were cashed was a substitute for the proceeds which is
transformed into the actual proceeds when the proceeds are obtained from
the payor bank. This interpretation would leave no mingled cash in the
bank and give the Code its literal effect by limiting a collecting bank's liability through subsection (3).
Slightly different problems arise when the court discussed the forged
checks that were deposited and, at a later date, withdrawn before the discovery of the forgery. 40 In contrast to the situation where the checks were
immediately cashed, the collecting bank here had an opportunity to receive
the proceeds from the payor bank prior to paying out funds over the counter.
It could be argued that when the collecting bank pays out money from an
account which had been credited with the proceeds of a forged instrument,
it then parts with the proceeds. 4 1 Although this argument is logical, it creates
the inequitable result of providing the true owner with a remedy where the
forger cashes the check and immediately takes the cash payment, while
denying the check owner a remedy under section 3-419 if the forger first
34. Id.
35. See note 13 supra.
36. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-419(1)(c).
37. 507 P.2d at 614, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
38.. id.
39. "The mere fact that the cash of the claimant is indistinguishably mingled with
the cash of the bank does not cut off the claimant's interest, but he acquires an equitable lien upon the whole of the mingled cash in the bank." 5 A. ScoTr, LAW OF
TRusrs 3734 (1967).
40. 507 P.2d at 614, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
41. Indeed, commentators have suggested the Ervin case may stand for this rule.
ADVANCED ALI-ABA CoURsE OF STUDY ON BANKING AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 54-57 (1968).
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deposits the forged check. The court in Cooper avoids this inequitable result by finding that a bank that accepts an instrument for deposit retains
the proceeds of the instrument upon withdrawal. 42 This conclusion was
reached by the argument that a bank which acts upon a forged instrument
for its depositor is in an agency status during the collection process. The
depositor is given a provisional credit for the proceeds. 43 Upon remittance
of the proceeds, the funds generally become co-mingled with the bank's cash
and are not held apart from the depositor. The agency status is terminated,
the depositor is given full credit for the amount, and the relationship is
changed into that of debtor-creditor. When the depositor finally withdraws
its funds, it is withdrawing money out of the general bank cash and not
the proceeds. This is significant because section 3-419(3) provides that a
representative's liability will only extend to the amount of proceeds remain-

ing in its hands when the other subsection (3) requirements are met. Since,
according to Cooper, the collecting bank does not part with the proceeds
of a forged check, it cannot avail itself of the section 3-419(3) defense.
The bank's liability continues to extend over the check's full proceeds.
The court sought to strengthen its interpretation of section 3-419(3) by
alluding to the expressed purpose of the UCC as stated in section 1-102:
"to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions. '' 44 In accordance with this section, the simplest remedy at law by
an aggrieved payee is a direct suit against the collecting bank that will be
ultimately liable. If the subsection (3) defense were available to a collecting bank, contrary -to common law and the holding in Cooper, the direct
action by the payee against the collecting bank would be blocked. The
payee would be forced into a circuitous round of suits first by the payee
against the drawee, then by the drawer bank against the collecting bank. 45
As the court points out, it is difficult to believe the Uniform Commercial
Code would modify the direct action available at common law, an approach
which has served to expedite recovery by the payee.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It could be argued that the courts in Ervin and Cooper have ignored the
clear statutory language of section 3-419(3) which provides a defense to
collecting banks, and have fashioned the law to their own preference. But
the only two courts that have had squarely to interpret the subsection have
42. 507 P.2d at 614, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
43. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-201.
44. The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102 (the purposes and rules on construction section) comment states: "The act should be construed in accordance with
its underlying purposes and policies. The text of each section should be read in light
of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as
a whole, and the application of the language should be construed narrowly or broadly,
as the case may be, in conformity with the purposes and policies involved."
45. The payee can sue the payor bank under § 3-419 and the payor bank has a
direct cause of action against the collecting bank under § 4-207. Note, it appears that
the subsection (3) defense would be unavailable to the payor bank if it is not also
a depositary bank, for this subsection specifically mentions only depositary or collecting
banks.
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rendered it inapplicable to collecting banks that have cashed forged checks.
This, at least, indicates that the language is susceptible to interpretation.
The court in Cooper chose to base its holding on the statutory term "proceeds." Since "proceeds" is not defined in the Code, the court was within
its judicial province to interpret this term. Pursuing this approach, the
court in Cooper was on firmer ground than the court in Ervin that rendered
an interpretation of "representative," a term with which the Code had already dealt. While it is certainly the prerogative of the drafters to change
the common law, Cooper follows the more commercially reasonable approach. This approach recognizes that the collecting bank is ultimately
liable for converting a forged check under the Code, 46 that the equities favor
placing this liability on the collecting bank rather than the payee, 47 and that
the common law has followed this rule for almost 200 years. 48 Section
3-419(3) needs uniform amendment to clarify the application of this subsection.
Kenneth A. Braun

Harsher Sentencing by Jury on Retrial Is Permissible:
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe
The petitioner was found guilty by a jury in Georgia of robbery by open
force or violence,' and was sentenced by the jury2 to a term of fifteen years
imprisonment. After his writ for habeas corpus was granted in federal
court, petitioner was retried, before a different judge and a new jury, and
was again convicted, the jury increasing the punishment to life imprisonment. Because he believed the increased sentence to be unconstitutional,3
petitioner again sought habeas corpus relief, but was unsuccessful. Review
was sought in the United States Supreme Court, where petitioner contended
that the increased sentence violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment and deprived him of due process of law under the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: The imposition of a harsher sentence by a jury upon retrial does not violate the double
jeopardy clause, nor does it deprive a defendant of due process of law, so
46. See note 45 supra, and accompanying text.
47. See note 17 supra, and accompanying text.

48. See, e.g., Mead v. Young, 4 T.R. 28 (1790).
1. No. 229, [1957] Ga. Laws 261. This statute was revised in 1968. See GA.
ANN. § 26-1902 (1968).
2. Georgia is one of eight states which permit jurors to impose the sentence in
felony cases. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2307 (1947); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2502
(1935); Ky. REV. STAT. § 9.84 (1970); Mo. R. CiuM. P. 27.02; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 926 (1958); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2704 (Supp. 1973); TEx. CODE CRIM.
CODE

PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-291 (1950).

3. The petitioner based his claim on the holding in North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969). See notes 11-17 infra, and accompanying text.
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long as the jury is not informed of the prior sentence and the second sentence is not otherwise a product of vindictiveness. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,
412 U.S. 17 (1973).
I.

DUE PROCESS AND HARSHER SENTENCING

In early cases presented before the United States Supreme Court concerning harsher sentences on retrial, defendants unsuccessfully argued that the
more severe sentence was prohibited because of the double jeopardy clause
of the fifth amendment. Subsequently, however, defendants turned to the
contention that harsher sentencing violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Some lower courts were receptive to this argument
and placed restrictions on harsher sentences imposed at retrial after the reversal of the original conviction.

4

In Stroud v. United States5 the Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy provision did not protect a defendant from receiving a harsher sentence
on retrial. The Court reasoned that the protection afforded was against a
second trial after previous conviction or acquittal for the same offense,
where the defendant had not taken an appeal. 6 Thus, it was permissible
to impose a harsher sentence upon a successful appellant if he was reconvicted, 7 notwithstanding the double jeopardy protection.8 After Stroud the
Court uniformly rejected the application of -the double jeopardy protection
to sentencing. 9

With time, however, lower federal courts limited harsher sentencing on
retrial upon the basis of the due process and equal protection clauses. 10 The
4. See note 10 inlra, and accompanying text.
5. 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
6. Id. at 18.
7. Id. It is settled law that a defendant may be retried for the same offense
where his first conviction was reversed because of trial court error. Numerous theories
have been stated by the courts to uphold ,this contention. See, e.g., Brewster v. Swope,
180 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1950) (appellant is placed in second jeopardy but he waives
his plea of former jeopardy by asking that the conviction be set aside); State v. Aus,
105 Mont. 82, 69 P.2d 584 (1937) (continuous jeopardy which does not end until
conviction or acquittal is final). The Supreme Court, in North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969), stated that "the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest,
been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean." 395 U.S. at 721.
8. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), is often cited in support of a
prohibition against increased sentence on retrial. But in Green the defendant could
have been convicted by the jury at the original trial of either first or second degree
murder. The jury convicted him of second degree murder, and, therefore, on retrial
he could not be convicted of first degree murder, a crime of which he had been impliedly acquitted at the first trial. It is obviously distinguishable from cases in which
the defendant was reconvicted of a crime of which he had already been convicted.
The proponents of the Green argument assert, however, that by way of analogy a
defendant is "acquitted" of any higher punishment than that he received at the first
trial, and therefore, the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial is a violation of
the double jeopardy provision. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726-28
(1969) (Douglas, J., concurring), noted in 19 AM. U.L. REV. 290, 292-93 (1970).
9. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Robinson v. United
States, 324 U.S. 282 (1945). For discussion of the application of double jeopardy
to sentencing, see Steele, The Doctrine of Multiple Prosecution in Texas, 22 Sw. L.J.
567, 576 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Rice v. Simpson, 274 F. Supp. 116 (M,D. Ala. 1967) (on retrial
defendant not given credit for time served under original sentence); Patton v. State,
256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1968) (absent reasons for doing so, harsher sentence on retrial violates due process).
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United States Supreme Court recognized the validity of the due process argument in North Carolinav. Pearce," that "vindictiveness against a defendant
for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the
sentence [the judge imposes] after a new trial.' 2 In other words, a defendant cannot be punished by a more severe sentence merely because he
obtained a new trial as the result of a successful appeal.' 3 The Court restricted judges from imposing a more severe sentence at retrial except in
cases where the reasons for doing so "affirmatively appeared . . . based

upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of
the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding."14
The petitioner in Pearce also argued that a harsher sentence on retrial
was prohibited because of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. He asserted that those who appealed were placed in an invidious classification because they risked the imposition of greater sentences
on retrial while those who did not appeal or did not otherwise succeed in
getting their convictions set aside did not risk the harsher sentencing.'
The
Court rejected this claim, stating that "[t]o fit the problem of [Pearce] into
an equal protection framework is a task too Procrustean to be rationally
accomplished."' 6 The Court observed that the result of a defendant's appeal was dependent "upon a particular combination of infinite variables
peculiar to each individual trial" and that the petitioner was no more invidiously classified than one whose appeal is rejected and is thus denied the
opportunity of acquittal." 7 Another fallacy in petitioner's argument which
was emphasized by the Court was that if the crime had not been committed
in the first place, petitioner would not have been on trial risking punishment.
By petitioner's reasoning, those accused of crime, and on trial, would be
placed in an invidious classification [against which the law protects] simply
because those who have not been accused of crime do not face the risk of
conviction and sentence. Although the Court rejected the petitioner's equal
protection argument, Pearce became the first Supreme Court decision to
limit the prerogative of imposing a harsher sentence on retrial, a prerogative
which the Court had recognized, with no restrictions, since 1919 in Stroud.
The Second Circuit extended the Pearce holding in United States v.
11. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
12. Id. at 725.
13. The term "appeal" is used to mean either an appeal per se to the appellate
courts following a conviction, or a collateral attack on the conviction through application for writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. For the purposes of the
rule announced in Pearce, it makes no difference which -route the defendant takes in
order to obtain a new trial. See Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 396, 397
(6th Cir. 1944), aff'd on other grounds, 324 U.S. 282 (1945).
14. 395 U.S. at 726. The term "identifiable conduct . . . occurring after the time
of the original sentencing proceeding" refers to activities of the defendant after the
first trial which are a reflection on his character and his intentions of living within
the boundaries of the law. It has been suggested that examples of such conduct would
include antisocial acts committed while in prison or on bail and attempted escapes
from prison. See Note, Harsher Sentence on Retrial, 38 TENN. L. REv. 562 (1971).
15. 395 U.S. at 722.
16. Id. at 723.
17. Id. at 722-23.
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Barash by limiting not only increased prison sentences, but also increased
fines, suspended sentences, and probation periods. 18 The question of
harsher sentencing inevitably evolved to that of whether a sentencing jury
was subject to the same or similar restrictions. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit answered this question in the negative. In affirming the
denial of habeas corpus relief to the petitioner in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 19
following his second trial, that court stated that the possibility of jury vindictiveness was remote, and it placed the burden of proving vindictiveness
squarely on the defendant. 20 It emphasized the fact that in Pearce,
"[t]here was no denunciation of increased sentences as such."'21 In Casias
v. Beto, another Fifth Circuit case involving harsher sentencing, the court
stated that "the Pearce factor of retaliation or vindictiveness does not apply
where a jury sets the penalty and where, as here, the record reflects no
knowledge by the jury of the earlier trial which might engender a desire
'22
for retaliation."
In other circuits defendants contended that harsher sentencing impaired
the choice whether to appeal after conviction. In other words, the exercise
of the right to appeal was chilled by the possibility of a harsher sentence
on retrial. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits responded to the question in
Levine v. Peyton23 and Pendergrass v. Neil,24 cases which were clearly contrary to the Fifth Circuit holdings. 25 The Fourth Circuit in Levine emphasized that a defendant's right to appeal should not be chilled by the fear
of a harsher sentence on retrial. 26 Similarly, in Pendergrass the Sixth Circuit outlined several possibilities of jury vindictiveness, 27 and both it and
Levine concentrate on the "chilling effect" on the defendant's right to appeal. 28 In Pendergrass,the Sixth Circuit stated: "The existence of [a 'chilling
effect'] places an unjustly convicted defendant in the anomalous and unfair
predicament of having to run the risk of a harsher sentence merely to obtain
that to which he was constitutionally entitled at the beginning-viz., a fair
'29
and error-free trial."
The Supreme Court has recognized the invalidity of a federal statute
which places a "chilling effect" on the defendant's right to a jury trial. In
18. 428 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971), noted
in 5 GA. L. REV. 194 (1970).
19. 455 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1972).
20. Id. at 643.
21. Id. at 642.
22. 459 F.2d 54, 55 (5th Cir. 1972).
23. 444 F.2d 525 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971).
24. 456 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1972), vacated, 412 U.S. 935 (1973) (vacated because
of the Supreme Court's decision in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe).
25. Casias v. Beto, 459 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 455
F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1972).
26. 444 F.2d at 526.
27. The court noted several factors which would arouse suspicion in jurors or make
difficult selection of uninformed jurors. For example, disparity between date of criminal events and the date of retrial, use of the first trial record for impeachment purposes on cross-examination at the second trial, and the probable public notoriety of
the defendant where the crime occurred in a rural area, are all factors which may
indicate to jurors that defendant is being retried after appeal. 456 F.2d at 470-71.
28. 456 F.2d at 471; 444 F.2d at 526.
29. 456 F.2d at 471.

NOTES

1974]

United States v. Jackson3 0 the defendant was indicted under the Federal
Kidnaping Act,31 which provided that only upon recommendation of the jury
could the death sentence be imposed. If the defendant waived his right to
a jury trial, he was assured that under the statute the death sentence could
not be imposed by the judge. The Court held unconstitutional that portion
of the statute which made the "risk of death" the price for asserting the
right to a jury trial. In so concluding, the Court stated that "[i]f the provision had no other purpose or effect than to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them, then it
would be patently unconstitutional. '32 The decision in Jackson is important
to Chaffin because the questions presented in both cases are similar, that
is, whether a governmentally imposed choice should be prohibited because
it chills the exercise of a basic constitutional right. The difference lies only
with the specific right involved in each case.
II.

CHAFFIN V. STYNCHCOMBE

In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe petitioner's double jeopardy claim was rejected
by the Court on the basis of Stroud v. United States.3 The Court did not
consider the equal protection claim advanced by the petitioner, that a defendant who received close to the minimum sentence (as petitioner did)
faces a far greater risk than the defendant who received near the maximum. 3 4 The decision of the Court concentrated on two key issues: vin35
dictiveness and the "chilling effect" on the right to appeal.
The petitioner in Chaffin attempted to extend the holding in Pearce to
the area of jury sentencing. Stating that the Pearce decision was based on
"the hazard of vindictiveness," 3 6 the Court held that "there is no basis for
8' 7
holding that jury resentencing poses any real threat of vindictiveness.
The Court observed that the jury has no "personal stake in the prior conviction and no motivation to engage in self-vindication. 38 This is because the
jury, unlike the judge, has not been reversed by the appellate court. Safeguards are needed to protect the defendant only when the judge is to impose
sentence.8 1
30. 390 U.S. 570 (1968).

31. Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 760 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1972).

32. 390 U.S. at 581.
33.

251 U.S. 15 (1919).

In Pearce, however, the unwaivering rule with regard

to harsher sentencing and double jeopardy was perhaps best stated. See note 7 supra.
34. Brief for Petitioner at 9. The argument more fully given was that the defendant who received close to the maximum sentence would have little or nothing to lose
by appealing, since a sentence increase would be less severe on him than on a defendant who received a lighter sentence at the original trial. The latter is compelled to
make the choice whether to appeal, for if he is successful he faces the risk of receiving a more severe sentence.
35. Although the Court's decision is based upon constitutional grounds, the arguments set forth by Mr. Justice Powell in the majority opinion indicate that policy
factors were influential in the decision.
36. 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973).
37. Id. at 28.
38. Id. at 27.
39. For a pre-ChafIin discussion of the distinction between a judge and jury imposing a harsher sentence at retrial, see Note, supra note 14, at 570.
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Underlying the Court's reasoning is the presumption that a jury is not
aware of its capacity for vindictiveness. 40 When a trial judge is reversed, he,
of course, is aware of his capacity to punish the defendant for his appeal. 41
The reversal indicates error on the judge's part at the original trial, and the
dissatisfaction accompanying a reversal might manifest itself in the form of a
harsher sentence upon retrial. Conversely, even in a situation where the reversal is based on lack of evidence upon which a conviction could be sustained,
there will be a new and different jury at the second trial. In a majority of
cases, the jurors will have never heard of the defendant, nor will they be aware
of anything concerning the prior trial, conviction, or sentence.
This reasoning, however, is replete with exceptions, not all of which can
be said to be rare occurrences. For example, the wide publicity given a
particularly notorious crime may cause difficulty in finding an uninformed
juror. Judge Edwards of the Sixth Circuit in Pendergrass pointed to many
ways in which jury vindictiveness may be produced by knowledge of the
42
original trial.
If the absence of jury vindictiveness is assumed, the retaliatory motives
of the prosecutor and judge can nevertheless produce a harsher sentence by
the jury. The Court dismissed as remote the possibility that vindictiveness
in the jury may be produced by the prosecutor and the judge. 43 Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissent that although the Court was quite
correct in assuming that the prosecutor may have innocent reasons for requesting a harsher sentence, nevertheless the possibility for vindictiveness is
very real, and that, in any event, the defendant will have an extremely difficult time in proving a retaliatory motive. 44 The judge, on the other hand,
may charge the jury in such a manner that they are influenced to impose
4
a higher sentence at the second trial. 5
As Mr. Justice Marshall recognized in his dissent, the issue is not just vindictiveness: "For, by establishing one rule for sentencing by judges and another for sentencing by juries, the Court places an unnecessary burden on
the defendant's right to choose to be tried by a jury after a successful appeal."' 46 If the defendant does not elect to have a jury trial, in states where
the jury sentences, the judge will impose the sentence and will, therefore,
be subject to the limitations set forth in Pearce. As the Court held in
United States v. Jackson, a sentencing structure is unconstitutional when it
requires an election by the defendant which impairs his right to a jury
trial. 47 A defendant on retrial would be foolish to elect a jury when the
40. This is, of course, subject to the limitation, as the Court recognized, that the
jury not be told the length of the original sentence. 412 U.S. at 28.
41. Id. at 27.
42. 456 F.2d at 470-71; see note 27 supra, and accompanying text.
43. 412 U.S. at 27 n.13.
44. Id. at 36 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
45. Id. Mr. Justice Stewart does not elaborate on just how the judge might so
influence the jury. It is submitted, however, that the judge, prompted by his distaste
for what he feels to have been a meritless appeal, will portray the defendant as a
person worthy of long imprisonment.
46. Id. at 43-44 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

47. 390 U.S. at 582.
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48
jury will be free to administer a longer and more severe sentence.
Assuming the absence of jury vindictiveness, the question becomes
whether the possibility of a harsher sentence on retrial in itself will chill the
exercise of the defendant's right to appeal. The Court, while not explicitly
denying the existence of a "chilling effect," reasoned that any defendant involved in the criminal justice process will inevitably face "government imposed choice[s] that [have] the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights." 4 9 This is seen as an "inevitable attribute" 50 of the
system. Thus, in every case the defendant must balance his interest in the
exercise of his rights, such as the right to a jury trial or the right to appeal,
with the risk he will face if he decides to exercise the right. The Court
in Jackson recognized that when the defendant realizes that he faces the
death penalty only with a jury trial, he will be highly reluctant to exercise
that right. The question presented in Chaffin was whether the risk of a
harsher sentence on retrial will impair to an appreciable extent the defendant's choice to appeal. The Court determined that the petitioner himself
was not chilled in the exercise of his right to appeal, 5 ' and that in any case,
the chill factor will often not be a deterrent of any significance.52
The Court dealt at some length with petitioner's claim that Jackson was
applicable by analogy to the present case. The essence of petitioner's argument was that if the Government could not compel a defendant to choose
between a jury and non-jury trial where the imposition of the death penalty
could be only on the recommendation of a jury, then it could not compel
him to take or not to take his constitutional right to appeal where by so
doing he exposes himself to the risk of an increased sentence if a new trial
is granted. The Court distinguished Jackson by stating that not every choice
imposed upon the defendant is forbidden, even if it has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights. 53 The inquiry must be made
on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the rights involved will be
54
appreciably impaired by compelling the defendant to make a choice.
Admittedly, the question presented in Chaffin makes it clear that a "chilling effect" on !the right to appeal does exist, although the Court feels that
the defendant in most cases will not be aware of its existence when he de-

48. The effect of the defendant's decision to elect a jury trial was well illustrated
in lackson. While under the federal statute involved the jury was free to recommend

the death penalty, a judge sentencing under the same statute could impose no more
than a life sentence.
49. 412 U.S. at 30. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), Parker

v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970), all cases in which the defendants pleaded guilty to lesser charges in order to

avoid possible death sentences by a jury had they been convicted on the original

charges. The cases are to be distinguished from Jackson because in each either the
judge or jury was free to impose the death penalty had the defendant been found guilty
on the original charge.

50. 412 U.S. at 31.

51. Petitioner appealed each conviction to the Georgia appellate courts and sought

habeas corpus relief after each appeal was unsuccessful. See 225 Ga. 602, 170 S.E.2d
426 (1969); 227 Ga. 327, 180 S.E.2d 741 (1971).

However, on each appeal, he was

not aware of the possibility of a harsher sentence if retried.
52. 412 U.S. at 33.
53. Id. at 30.
54. Id. at 32.
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cides whether to appeal. The Court is correct in its conclusion that the
criminal justice process imposes many compelled choices on defendants,""
and that each of these presents, to an extent, a "chilling effect" on the exercise of a right. An obvious example is the plea bargain. By promising the
defendant a lighter sentence or lesser charge in return for his guilty plea,
the defendant is impliedly, if not expressly, told that an insistence on a plea
of innocence and a jury trial will expose him to a more severe charge and,
if he is found guilty, sentence. In deciding whether to accept the bargain,
,the defendant's exercise of his right to plead not guilty and to be granted
a full trial with jury is chilled. As the recent decision in Santobello v. New
York5 6 demonstrated, however, plea bargaining is a legitimate practice in
criminal justice administration. The overriding interest with the plea bargain is expedition of the judicial process to avoid an overload which the present courts could not bear.
By analogy, in Chaffin the overriding interest compelling the choice is the
prerogative of the jury to impose a harsher sentence on retrial, based upon
its evaluation of the evidence and the character of the defendant. "Jury
sentencing, based on each jury's assessment of the evidence it hears and appraisal of the demeanor and character of the accused, is a legitimate practice. '57 Different juries will inevitably assess an individual defendant differently. The sanctity of the jury being what it is in our system of justice,
the question is essentially whether jury prerogative should be limited by a
chill factor imposed on the defendant in his decision whether to appeal.
The Court answered this in the -negative, but the question is not as clearcut as the Court has indicated. A defendant on retrial has been exposed
to jury prerogative at least once. Should he be exposed a second time to
the risks involved because he chooses to appeal from what to him was not
an error-free trial?58 The risks would not be imposed had the defendant
been given an error-free ,trial in the first instance, so that imposition of a
harsher sentence at retrial not only chills the right to appeal, but also punishes the defendant for the trial court's error, which caused the reversal.
Those two considerations, when added to the fact that the defendant has
once been exposed to jury prerogative, override any conclusion that the
jury's right to impose a harsher sentence at the second trial should not in
some way be limited.
55. See, e.g., Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), where defendant unsuccessfully contended that allowing the jury to determine guilt and punishment in a single

trial compelled him to forego his fifth amendment right to remain silent, whereas in
a bifurcated trial of guilt and punishment, defendant retained his right -to remain silent
in the "guilt trial," but at the punishment stage he could argue his case for mitigation

of punishment. See also Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
56. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Santobello intimates, however, that while the prosecutor
is bound to perform the bargain, the defendant is not. This protects the defendant to
a certain extent and lessens the "chilling effect" presented by a plea bargain situation.
57. 412 U.S. at 32.
58. The argument in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), that exposure
to limitless sentencing (at least as between the minimum and maximum in the particular statute) is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause is applicable here, in that defendant had run the gauntlet of possible sentences once, had risked conviction once,
and, thus, should not be subject to that risk again.
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Although the Court did not deal with issues of equal protection in Chaffin,
as did earlier cases, 59 a consideration of this concept is important. 0 In
Pearce the petitioner argued that the possibility of a harsher sentence on
retrial placed him in an invidious classification comprised of those who succeeded in getting their convictions set aside, as compared with those who
either chose not to appeal or those who appealed unsuccessfully. The
Court in Pearce rejected this argument. 61 In Chaffin the petitioner did not
raise any contention that he was placed in an invidious classification because he committed a crime in a state where jury sentencing is practiced.
Because the judge does not sentence, the Pearce protections are unavailable.
This results in certain protection being afforded one in a locality where
judge sentencing is practiced. In the jury-sentencing jurisdictions, however,
the defendant receives no protection against a jury which can be just as vindictive as a judge. Nevertheless this contention must be rejected because
each state has province over its criminal justice system and the Constitution
authorizes sentencing by the judge or jury. Thus, it cannot be asserted that
equal protection is denied when the state uses one mode of sentencing or
the other. A defendant in one state is not required to receive all the rights
of a defendant in another state, so long as no rights guaranteed by the Cons-titution are withheld.
III. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court in Chaffin placed no restriction on
harsher sentencing by juries on retrial, so long as the sentence is not a product of vindictiveness. As a result, defendants tried in states where juries
sentence do not receive the protection afforded defendants in states where
judges sentence. But it is clear that a defendant in a jury sentencing state
requires just as much protection as any other defendant. The jury can be
vindictive because the actions of the judge or prosecutor can achieve that
result, or because members of the jury know about the defendant or his case
history.
As a remedy, Mr. Justice Stewart suggested that the trial judge be compelled to reduce the sentence imposed by the jury at retrial, if it exceeds
the original sentence, to the length of the original sentence, unless he sets
forth affirmative reasons for allowing the increased sentence to stand, under
the requirements set forth in Pearce.6 2 This suggestion would result in no
undue restriction of the defendant's right to choose a jury trial because the
possibility of vindictiveness as well as the "chilling effect" would be substantially reduced, although the jury might still be biased as to guilt. This would
put defendants in jury-sentencing states on an equal footing with defendants
59. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).

60. The petitioner presented an equal protection argument to the Court, but the
Court failed to treat this argument in its opinion. See Brief for Petitioner at 8-11,
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
61. 395 U.S. at 722-23.
62. 412 U.S. at 37 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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elsewhere. Jury prerogative having been exercised at the original trial,
there is no benefit to the state which outweighs the harm of chilling the right
to appeal and to a jury trial which may result from the possibility that the
defendant may receive a harsher sentence at retrial.
Michael E. Alexander

The Hatch Act's Prohibitions Against Political
Activity by Government Employees Are Constitutional
The National Association of Letter Carriers, six federal employees, and
certain Democratic and Republican political committees desired to campaign
for candidates for public office, participate as delegates in political conventions, and seek desirable individuals to become members of certain political
committees. Due to the threatened and actual enforcement of section 9(a)
of the Hatch Act,' which prohibits federal employees from taking "an active
part in political management or in political campaigns," plaintiffs sought an
injunction against the Civil Service Commission, alleging that section 9(a)
is vague, overly broad, and in conflict with the first amendment of the
United States Constitution. 2 The district court granted the requested injunction and held section 9(a) to be "unacceptable when measured by the need
to eliminate vagueness and overbreadth in the sensitive area of free expression. ''3 The Government appealed, and the United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction. 4 Held, reversed: Congress can constitutionally
prohibit federal employees from engaging in certain clearly identifiable acts
of political management -and campaigning if the prohibitions are set out in
terms that an ordinary person using common sense can sufficiently understand and observe. United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers,413 U.S. 548 (1973).
I.

EARLY RESTRAINTS ON THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

The first amendment of the United States Constitution proclaims that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or the
1. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970).
2. Plaintiffs made the same allegation with regard to 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3)
(1970), the provision taken from § 12(a) of the Hatch Act, Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch.
640, § 1, 54 Stat. 767, which imposes similar restrictions on various state employees
working on projects that are federally funded. However, the district court held that
plaintiffs were not proper representatives of the class of state employees covered by
the Hatch Act and could not bring the action on their behalf.

National Ass'n of Let-

ter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp. 578, 579 n.1 (D.D.C.
1972).
3.

346 F. Supp. at 583.

4. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 409
U.S. 1058 (1972).

19741

NOTES

press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for redress of grievances." There is -widespread agreement
that a major purpose of the first amendment is to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs 5 and the right of the citizenry to associate politically. 6 While first amendment rights are not absolute and may be regulated
within reasonable limits, 7 they have traditionally been viewed as "supremely precious in our society,"'8 for the right to associate politically and the right
to speak on public affairs amount to "more than self-expression"; 9 they are
the "essence of self-government." 10 Therefore, first amendment rights occupy a preferred position in our constitutional scheme and only the existence
of very rare and serious circumstances can justify placing restrictions on
them."
Various restraints have been imposed by both the executive 1 2 and the
legislative' 3 branches on the exercise of first amendment rights by government employees. The purposes of these restraints have been either to protect these employees from excessive political pressures' 4 or to promote efficiency and integrity in government. 15 The earliest attempts to restrict the
first amendment rights of government employees involved restrictions on
policemen, firemen, or others involved in "police power" activities where
discipline of a quasi-military nature was involved. 16 However, the growth
of the spoils system following the Civil War stimulated a drive for the ex17
pansion of such restrictions to cover other types of government employees.
In 1883 Congress passed the Civil Service Act' s which provided that "no
person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service,"' 9 and that
"no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or in5. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).

6. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968); UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).

7. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30-31 (1968).
8. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).

9. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
10. Id.

11. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940).

12. See, e.g., President Jefferson's executive order of 1801 which made it improper
for any executive employee to attempt to influence the voting of any citizen as described in 10 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESMENTS 98-99 (1899),
quoted and cited by the Court in Letter Carriers,413 U.S. at 557; President T. Roose-

velt's executive order of 1907, Exec. Order No. 642, which is cited at note 23 infra;
President Truman's executive order of 1947 that prescribed the procedures necessary
for the administration of a loyalty program for members of the executive branch, Exec.
Order No. 9835, 3 C.F.R. 627 (1957).
13. See, e.g., the Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403; the Hatch
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1970).
14. Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3

383 (1969).

SUFFOLK

U.L. REV. 380,

15. Nelson, Public Employees and the Right To Engage in Political Activity, 9
VAND. L. REv. 27, 42 (1955).
16. Sherman, Loyalty and the Civil Servant, 20 RocKY MT. L. REV. 381, 387
(1948).

17. Id.
18. Civil Service Act of 1883, ch. 27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403.
19. Id. at 404.
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fluence to coerce the political action of any person or body."' 20 The Act
gave -the President the authority to promulgate rules to carry out the purposes
of the Act and established the Civil Service Commission to administer it.
Judicial approval of these restrictions on the first amendment rights of
government employees was first evidenced in the 1892 decision of McAuliffe
v. Mayor.21 Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, enunciated what has become known as the "privilege doctrine":
The doctrine asserts that 'because a person is not forced to accept government employment, he can be required to surrender certain constitutional
rights as a condition of such employment. In the words of Justice Holmes,
"[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman. ' 22
Further restrictions were placed on the first amendment rights of certain
government employees when on June 3, 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt
issued an executive order that revised and expanded Civil Service Rule I
to read: "Persons who . . . are in the competitive classified service, while
retaining the right to vote as they please and to express privately their opinions on all political subjects, shall take no active part in political manage'23
ment or in political campaigns."
II.

THE HATCH ACT AND SUBSEQUENT CASES

After much debate, 24 Congress in 1939 passed the Hatch Act 25 in an effort to eliminate corruption and partisan politics from the federal civil service system. 26 Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act generally incorporated Civil
Service Rule I and extended its prohibitions so as to make them applicable
to all federal employees, not just classified service employees. Prohibitions
against taking "an active part in political management or in political campaigns" 27 were defined in section 15 as "those acts of political management
or political campaigning which were prohibited on the part of employees in
the competitive service before July 9, 1940, by determinations of the Civil
'28
Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President.
20. Id.
21. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See also Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485, 492 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1951).
22. 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
23. Rule I, U.S.C.S.C. (1907), cited in Buckley, Political Rights of Government
Employees, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 568, 568-69 (1970). See also 1 PRESIDENTIAL ExECUTIVE ORDERS 61 (1944) for a brief synopsis of Exec. Order No. 642 (1907).
24. While most Senators and Congressmen agreed that the prevention of pernicious
political activity was a worthy goal, the widespread disagreement concerned whether
Senator Hatch's act was unnecessarily, and possibly unconstitutionally, restrictive. See
84 CONG. REC. 9594-639 (1939) (remarks of Messrs. Dempsey, Celler, Healey, Rees,
Springer, Gwynne, Robinson, McLean, Guyer, Creal, Hobbs, and Michener).
25. Act of Aug. 2, 1939, ch. 410, § 2, 53 Stat. 1147 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 732127 (1970)).
In 1940 the Hatch Act was amended in order to extend its provisions
to state and local agencies whose principle employment is in regard to activities financed by the United States. Act of July 19, 1940, ch. 640, § 2, 54 Stat. 767 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-08 (1970)).
26. See 84 CONG. REC. 4303, 9603-04, 9610 (1939) (remarks of Messrs. Hatch,
Springer, and Michener).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970).
28. Id,
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By the early 1940's the Supreme Court had developed the practice of
balancing competing interests when ruling on the constitutionality of a statute which controls activities in such a way as to indirectly infringe upon
first amendment rights. 29 Where first amendment rights are restricted or
regulated to further a governmental interest, the Court stated that its duty
was to determine which of the two conflicting interests deserved greater protection. The Court also held that whenever a statute restricts or regulates
first amendment rights it must be narrowly drawn, 30 and its constitutionality
should be viewed in the light of the statute's total scope and effect rather
than simply in light of its isolated effect on the particular individual before
the Court. 3' Furthermore, the Government was required to show that no
less offensive alternatives existed to promote the governmental interest ad32
vanced by the statute.
In 1947 the Supreme Court considered and upheld the constitutionality
33
of section 9(a) of the Hatch Act in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
a case considered by many as being outside the mainstream of first amendment case law.3 4 Recognizing that first amendment rights are not absolute,
the Court professed to be balancing the constitutional rights of federal employees to associate politically and to discuss freely governmental affairs
against the supposed evil of political partisanship on the part of government
employees.3 5 By saying that "[flor regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed
by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service," 36 the
Court simply required that restrictions imposed on the constitutional rights
of federal employees need only be reasonably necessary for the promotion
29. The language that came to be cited as the authority for the practice of balancing may be found in Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939), where Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, stated:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of [freedom of
speech and of the press] is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences
or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify
such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult
task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the
free enjoyment of the rights.
For a comprehensive discussion of the balancing practice, see Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Mendelson, On the Meaning of the
First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962); Frantz,
Is the First Amendment Law? A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REv.
729 (1963).
30. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940); accord, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960).
31. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 96-98 (1940).
32. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161-62 (1939).
33. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
34. Mosher, Government Employees Under the Hatch Act, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.
233, 240-54 (1947); Nelson, supra note 15, at 33-50; Note, Political Sterilization of
Government Employees, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 295 (1947); Note, Statute Prohibiting
Political Activity by Public Employees Held Unconstitutional for Overbreadth, 42
N.Y.U.L. REv. 750, 751 (1967).
35. 330 U.S. at 95-96.
36. Id. at 101.
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of a legitimate governmental interest, while at the same time leaving the
ultimate determination of reasonableness and balancing of the interests in37
volved to Congress.
In a barrage of decisions following Mitchell the Supreme Court abandoned the privilege doctrine,3 8 required the Government to prove that any
restrictions imposed on first amendment rights did indeed advance a compelling governmental interest, 39 and subjected legislation infringing on such
rights to a strict standard of review. 40 The Government was required to
show that no "less drastic means"' existed for safeguarding the compelling
governmental interest than those contained in the challenged legislation. In
addition, the Court closely examined all statutes brought before it involving
first amendment rights and determined them to be unconstitutional if
vague 4 2 or overbroad.43 At the same time, the Court once again examined
the challenged statute in light of its total scope rather than merely its effect
on the particular individual before the Court. 44 While these first amendment cases did not express a totally new body of constitutional law, they
certainly suggested that -the case law ignored by the Court in Mitchell had

been revitalized.

This development led many commentators, 45 several state

37. Note, Statute Prohibiting Political Activity by Public Employees Held Unconstitutional for Overbreadth, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 750, 751 (1967).
38. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra, at 605-06, the Court said that "the theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." Accord, Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
39. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
40. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). See also the additional cases cited in Note,
Section 15 of the Hatch Act Is Impermissibly Vague and Overbroad in Violation of
the First Amendment, 26 VAND. L. REV. 355, 360 n.28 (1973).
41. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1964); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
42. Quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33, 438 (1963), and Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958), the Supreme Court in Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967), summarized the Court's position in regard to statutory vagueness when first amendment rights are involved:
[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict in the area of
free expression . . . . Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity . . . . When one must guess what conduct may lose him
his position, one necessarily will steer far wider of the unlawful zone
• . . [because] [t]he threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as potently
as the actual application of sanctions.
For a good discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see Note, The Void-forVagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
43. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); United States v. Robel,
389 U.S. 258 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). A statute will generally be declared unconstitutionally overbroad if it includes both legal and illegal activity within the activities it prohibits. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971).
For a brief discussion of overbreadth and vagueness as applied to cases
involving first amendment rights, see Hobbs v. Thompson, 448 F.2d 456, 459-60 (5th
Cir. 1971).
44. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963).
45. Buckley, supra note 23, at 574-75; Note, Statute Prohibiting Political Activity
by Public Employees Held Unconstitutional for Overbreadth, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 750
(1967); Note, The Public Employee and Political Activity, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 380
(1969).
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courts, 46 and one federal district court4 7 to ignore or expressly question the
validity of -the Mitchell decision as a part of contemporary constitutional law.
III.

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF LETTERS CARRIERS

By "unhesitatingly reaffirm[ing]" Mitchell, the Supreme Court in Letter
Carriers48 held section 9(a) of the Hatch Act to be a legitimate exercise
of congressional authority to restrict first amendment rights in an effort to
promote an important governmental interest: the elimination of both partisan
influences on federal employees and the polical influence of federal employees on others. In rejecting the claim that section 9(a) is unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad, the Court stated that the Act's prohibitions are set
out in terms that an ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can
49
understand and adhere to.
The Court stated that its task was "to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the [Government], as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." 50 By declaring that Congress and the executive branch believed
that federal employees should not be able to engage in partisan political
activities, and refusing to question the validity of these beliefs, 51 the Court,
as it apparently has done in no other case except Mitchell, seems to have
left the important balancing of interests to the "joint judgment of the Executive and Congress."' 52 As indicated by Justice Douglas in a dissent in Letter
Carriers in which he was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, while
the standard of interest balancing adopted by the Court in Mitchell and apparently once again by the majority of the Court in Letter Carriers would
suffice "[o]n the run of social and economic matters,"' 3 it cannot do so
where basic first amendment rights are involved and deserving of a stricter
standard of review.
Justice Douglas also stated that the obviously vague and overbroad prohibitions of the Hatch Act create a "chilling effect" on the exercise of first
46. See, e.g., Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421
P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966); De Stefano v. Wilson, 96 N.J. Super. 592, 233
A.2d 682 (1967); Minielly v. State, 242 Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966).
47. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346
F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C. 1972).
48. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
49. Id. at 579.
50. Id. at 564, quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
51. The Court seems simply to have assumed that widespread participation by federal employees in political activities would pose a significant danger to the federal
Civil Service System by relying heavily on the various reasons advanced and accepted
by Congress for the passage of the Hatch Act. 413 U.S. at 564-67; see 84 CONG.
Rac. 9598, 9603-06, 9610 (1939) (remarks of Messrs. Taylor, Springer, Dempsey,
Gwynne, and Michener). It is difficult to understand how any of these reasons, expressed in 1939, can be used to indicate that stringent restrictions on the political
activities of federal employees is necessary today, especially in light of the fact that
most government workers are presently employed in nonsupervisory positions. Note,
supra note 40, at 364.
52. 413 U.S. at 566.
53. Id. at 596.
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amendment freedoms by federal employees. 5 4 The majority of the Court,
however, disagreed with all contentions that the Hatch Act's prohibitions
were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and stated that the prohibited activities, as defined in section 15 of the Act, were not open-ended but
were limited to those rules and proscriptions that had been developed under
Civil Service Rule I prior to the passage of the Act.55 The Court ignored
the fact that a statute need not be open-ended to be unconstitutionally
vague, as it is enough that it be "capable of sweeping and uneven application."5 6 While maintaining that the activities prohibited by section 9(a) of
the Hatch Act are set out in terms that an ordinary person exercising normal
judgment and common sense can sufficiently understand and observe, the
Court ignored the fact that there were in excess of 3,000 determinations of
prohibited activities 57 that were incorporated by reference into section 9(a)
by section 15, and that even those responsible for enforcing the Act's provisions had expressed doubts as to exactly what acts it prohibited. 58
The Court stated that an administrative restatement of the prohibitions
of Civil Service Rule I, Form 1236,1 0 rather than the more than 3,000 activities prohibited by the Civil Service Commission prior to 1940, was what
Congress intended to serve as its definition of prohibited partisan activities.60
The Civil Service Commission's Regulations on Permissible Activities, 6 ' a
listing of thirteen categories of permissible activities in which federal employees may engage under the Hatch Act, and Regulations on Prohibited Activities 62 are the successors of Form 1236. According to the Court, federal
employees should look to these regulations to determine in what activities
they are permitted to engage. This supposition of congressional intent, in
addition to being based on very questionable evidence, 63 ignored the express
language of section 15, which defines the prohibited activities outlined in
section 9 to be -those "prohibited on the part of employees in the competitive
service before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission under the rules prescribed by the President.16 4
Assuming, arguendo, that federal employees can rely on the Civil Service
Commission's Regulations on Permissible and Prohibited Activities, these
regulations are themselves unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The
54. Id. at 596-600.

55. Id. at 576.
56. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346

F. Supp. 578, 583 (D.D.C. 1972).
57. Rose, A Critical Look At The Hatch Act, 75 HAsv. L. REV. 510, 511 (1962).
58. See Statement by John Macy, Jr., Chairman of the Civil Service Commission,

before the Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, May 15, 1967,
in 3 THE

COMMISSION ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY

OF GOVERNMENT

PERSONNEL,

A COM-

15 (1968), as quoted and cited in National Ass'n of Letter Carriers
v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 346 F. Supp. 578, 582 n.8 (D.D.C. 1972).
59. For pertinent portions of Form 1236, see 86 CONG. 'REC. 2938-40 (1940).
60. 413 U.S. at 574.
61. 5 C.F.R. § 733.111 (1973).
62. Id. §§ 733.121, .122.
63. During the Senate debates on the Hatch Act in 1939, it was pointed out that
none of the Senators knew what was said in the rulings of the Civil Service Commission which were incorporated into Form Number 1236. See 86 CONG. REC. 2940
(1940) (remarks of Mr. Minton).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1970).
MISSION REPORT
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regulations state that a federal employee may "[e]xpress his opinion as an
' while also declarindividual privately and publicly on political subjects" 65
ing that a federal employee "may not take an active part in political management or in a political campaign, except as permitted by this subpart."' 6
The subpart referred to states, among other things:
Activities prohibited by . . . ,this section include but are not limited to . . . [e]ndorsing or opposing a partisan candidate for pub-

lic office or political party office in a political advertisement, a
broadcast, campaign literature, or similar material . . . [and] [a]ddressing a convention, caucus, rally, or similar gathering of a political party in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate
for public office or political party office .... 67
Because the acts prohibited are not limited by the Civil Service Commission's regulations, the federal employee is faced with thirteen categories of
specifically prohibited activities and an indefinite number of activities that
are susceptible of being prohibited at -the Commission's discretion. Therefore, the regulations can arguably be considered to be open-ended and more
vague than the more than 3,000 pre-1940 prohibitions. In either event, the
federal employee "must guess what conduct or ut-terance may lose him his
position" 66 and he likely "will 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . .'
[f]or '[,t]he threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions.' "69

The Court in Letter Carriers admitted that "i[t]here might be quibbles
about the meaning of taking an 'active part in managing' or about 'actively
participating in fund-raising' or about the meaning of becoming a 'partisan'
candidate for office" as such phrases are found in the Civil Service Commission's Regulations on Permissible and Prohibited Activities. 70 The standard
developed by 'the Court in previous cases 71 that a statute touching first
amendment rights must be narrowly drawn seems to indicate that a lengthy
but specific statute regulating such rights would be tolerated while a short
but vague statute would not. The Court ignored this by stating that the
quibbles are permissible, as they are attributable to the "limitation in the
English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief
.... ,,72 The Court also admitted that -there might be problems in distinguishing those activities permitted from those prohibited by the Civil Service
Commission's Regulations on Permissible and Prohibited Activities. 73 Indeed, there are problems which might well confuse a reasonably prudent
man of ordinary intelligence, such as being permitted to "[e]xpress his opin65. 5 C.F.R. § 733.111(a)(2) (1973).
66. Id.§ 733.122(a).
67. Id.§§ 733.122(b)(10), (12).
68. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); see note 42 supra.
69. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967), quoting NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
70. 413 U.S. at 578.
71. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
72. 413 U.S. at 578-79.
73. Id. at 579.
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ion as an individual privately and publicly on political subjects and candidates" 74 while not being allowed to address a "gathering of a political party
in support of or in opposition to a partisan candidate for public office
.. . .-7In support of its decision to declare section 9(a) of the Hatch Act
constitutional in spite of the quibbles about the meaning of key phrases contained in the Commission's regulations and the problems involved in distinguishing between those activities permitted and those prohibited by the
regulations, the Court stated that it was important that -the Civil Service
Commission had established a procedure whereby federal employees might
seek a ruling on whether or not a certain activity was permissible before
engaging in it.76 Such a procedure is really not helpful because an employee will have to "guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his
[job]" '77 if he has no time to seek a ruling, and may, indeed, avoid going
through the procedure because of the bother involved. Thus, it appears
clear that the Court abandoned, or at least ignored, the principle -that government may regulate in the area of first amendment rights only with narrow
specificity.
The Court devoted only two rather short paragraphs of its opinion to the
issue of overbreadth. 7s In giving such little attention to this issue, the Court
failed to view the breadth of the legislative abridgment of first amendment
rights in the light of less drastic means available for achieving its purpose,
as had been its previous practice.79 In fact, as already pointed out, the
Court never questioned, but merely assumed, the necessity for any restrictions on the first amendment rights of federal employees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

By ignoring a substantial body of first amendment case law, the Court's
holding in Letter Carriersshould either stimulate Congress to pass more farreaching restrictions on the exercise by federal employees of their first
amendment rights or, hopefully, to review the policy reasons advanced for
the Hatch Act's broad restrictions in the light of the composition of today's
Civil Service.80
More important than its effect on the Civil Service, however, is the fact
that the decision leaves the field of first amendment constitutional law in
a state of uncertainty. The Court delegated to Congress the task of balanc74. 5 C.F.R. § 733.111(a)(2) (1973).

75. Id. § 733.122(b)(12).
76. In an affidavit filed in the district court, the General Counsel for the Civil
Service Commission stated that "[t]he Information Unit [in the office of General
Counsel] answers inquiries, from whatever source, concerning the application of the
Hatch Act, Rule, and regulations." 413 U.S. at 580 n.22.
77. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 5,89, 604 (1967).
78. 413 U.S. at 580-81.
79. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1964); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).

80. A major reappraisal of the Hatch Act is already underway. Congress created
the Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel in 1966 which recommended major relaxations of the Act's restrictions. See Note, Hatch Act Prohibition
on Federal Employee Political Activity Held Unconstitutional for Overbreadth, 6 IND.

L. REV. 544, 556-57 (1973).
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ing the interests involved in a matter concerning first amendment rights,
rather than performing that crucial function itself. In addition, the Court
did not require the Government to prove that a substantial governmental
interest was being advanced by the imposition of restrictions on first amendment rights, or to demonstrate that no less drastic means existed to promote
the governmental interest involved. By the above, together with the Court's
refusal to require that section 9(a)'s restrictions on first amendment rights
be narrowly drawn, the Court may have set a dangerous precedent. Because of this failure to rely on many of the important first amendment cases
of recent years, it is questionable if the Court's "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust and wide-open" 8' still exists.
Jeffrey C. Londa

Kern County Land Company v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation:
An Approach to 16(b)
In a tender offer made to acquire control of Kern County Land Company
(Old Kern),' Occidental Petroleum Corporation purchased more than ten
percent of Old Kern's outstanding stock. Occidental's efforts were thwarted,
however, by a defensive merger between Old Kern and Tenneco Corporation. In the planned merger Old Kern stockholders were to exchange their
shares of Old Kern for Tenneco preferred stock on a share-for-share basis.
Within a month of its original tender offer Occidental granted a finding option to sell to Tenneco the Tenneco shares it received as a result of the
merger, the sale to take place at least six months after the tender offer expired. Occidental subsequently exchanged its Old Kern stock for Tenneco
stock, pursuant to the merger, and immediately sold the new stock to Tenneco and reaped a $19 million profit. New Kern, a corporation formed by
Tenneco, instituted an action under section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.2 The district court entered summary judgment for
New Kern, 3 and was reversed by the court of appeals. 4 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Held, affirmed: Where the transaction contained no
81. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
1. Old Kern became known as the 600 California Corporation after the reorganization described in the text. The name Old Kern is used to distinguish it from New
Kern, its successor as the Kern County Land Company.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(,b) (1970): "For the purpose of preventing the unfair use
of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner . . .any profit
realized by him from any purchase and sale . . .of any equity security of such issuer
within any period of less than six months . . .shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer ...." (Emphasis added.)
3. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 323 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
4. Abrams v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 450 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1971).
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possibility of speculative abuse of inside information, an involuntary exchange will not constitute a sale for purposes of section 16(b). Nor will
an option without the possibility of such abuse be treated as a sale in this
context. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S.
582 (1973).
I.

APPROACHES TO APPLICATION OF SECTION

16(b)

Section 16(b) was originally designed as a prophylactic measure, a crude
rule of thumb, 5 meant to prevent insider profits from short swing transactions." The statute applies to any "purchase and sale" or "sale and purchase" 7 of any equity securitys by a statutory insider within a six-month
period. The term "insider," for purposes of this section, includes one who
owns more than ten percent of any class of any equity security, an officer,
or director. 9 The statute presumes that such owners have inside information
which is subject to abuse. The rule was to be applied mechanically, requiring no actual showing of inside information or abuse.' 0 Profits from any
such "purchase and sale" are recoverable by the issuer 1 of the security regardless of the owner's intent.
All courts have mechanically applied the rule to the orthodox cash purchase and sale transaction. However, the statutory definition of purchase
and sale does not clearly cover the non-cash or "unorthodox" purchase and
sale. 12 There have developed two distinctly different interpretations of how
the statute should be applied to these unorthodox transactions. These are
the "objective" or mechanical approach and the "subjective" or pragmatic ap5. The phrase "crude rule of thumb" was first used by Thomas Corcoran in testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency to describe how the statute should be applied.
You hold the director [liable for short swing profits] irrespective of any
intention or expectation to sell within 6 months after, because it will be
absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation and you have to have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove that the director intended,
,at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. 6557 (1934).
6. A short swing transaction is one in which the purchase and sale both take
place within a 6-mon-th period.
7. Within the context of this statute, 4he terms "buy" and "purchase" include any
contract to buy, purchase, or otherwise acquire any equity security, the terms "sale"
or "sell" include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of any equity security. 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(a)(13), (14) (1970).
8. An "equity security" is: "any stock or similar security; or any security convertible

. . .

into such a security

. .

. ; or any other security which the Commission shall

deem to be of similar nature and consider necessary .. .for the protection of investors, to treat as an equity security." 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(11) (1970).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(a), (b)(1970).
10. S.REP. No. 1455, supra note 5.
11. The corporation isallowed to recover upon the theory that inside information
is a corporate asset and profits derived from misuse of it should be returned to the
corporation. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 24 (1966).
12. The term is from 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1069 (2d ed. 1961). It
has been applied to non-cash purchases and sales of stock. See Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7,th Cir. 1970) (options); Newmark v. RKO Gen. Inc., 425 F.2d
348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) (merger); Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d
82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (reclassification); Park & Tilford, Inc.
v. Schulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947) (conversions).
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proach. 1 3 Until the last decade most courts applied the objective approach
to any transaction that came within the purview of the statute. 1 4 No attempt was made to determine if the opportunity for actual abuse of inside
information existed; the fact that the court found :that the transaction was
a purchase and sale or a sale and purchase within six months was all that
was necessary for the defendant to be held liable. No distinction was drawn
between the orthodox or unorthodox transactions.
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.15 was the first major case to adopt the mechanistic approach. Two directors of Delendo Corporation had purchased and
sold common stock of the corporation within a six-month period. It was
conceded that there was no abuse of inside information. The court held
that section 16(b) was to be applied to the operative facts of the transaction
regardless of any lack of unfair use of inside information. Finding the defendants liable, the court wrote:
It is apparent . . . from the language of § 16(b) itself, as well as

from the Congressional hearings, that the only remedy which its framers
deemed effective for this reform was the imposition of a liability based
upon an objective measure of proof ....
A subjective standard of proof, requiring a showing of an actual unfair
use of inside information, would render senseless the provisions of the
legislation limiting the liability period to six months .... 16
In Park Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte17 the objective approach was applied
to a more unorthodox transaction and this case became the basis for the
application of the objective approach to all types of transactions. Involved was a conversion of preferred for common stock when within
six months of the conversion the defendants sold the common stock.
The court limited the issues to whether the two transactions had taken place
within six months and if they could be interpreted as a purchase and sale.
If both of these questions could be answered in the affirmative then the defendants were automatically liable.
In finding for the plaintiffs, the court held that Smolowe forbade the use
of any criteria other than those set forth in the statute. The strict application of these criteria and disgorging of any profits acquired was supposed
to give the statute a deterrent effect.' 8 This approach, void of consideration
13. For a discussion of these two approaches and their application, see Gadsby &
Treadway, Recent Developments Under Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 17 N.Y.L.F. 687 (1971); Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend in Regulating Insider Trading, 54 CORNELL L.Q. 45 (1969).
14. Exceptions to this application of the rule are found in Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959), where the court refused to apply the Park & Tiuford test to an involuntary conversion, without any chance
of insider abuse, and Roberts v. Eaton, 212 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
827 (1954), where a reclassification affected all shareholders equally and afforded no
speculative advantage to the insider defendants, although the court did suggest that a
reclassification could be a § 16(b) transaction if it lent itself to speculative abuse.
15. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
16. Id. at 235-36.
17. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1947).

18. Id. at 988.
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of any subjective elements, was employed by the majority of courts for thirty
9
years. 1
While decisions that strayed from this harsh interpretation were a rarity
until the early 1960's, 20 Ferraiolo v. Newman 21 provided the standard for
what was to become the subjective approach. This was the first case in
which a court reviewed all of the facts subjectively and decided that section
16(b) would apply to this unorthodox transaction only if a real possibility
of abuse of inside information existed.22
Rejecting the objective approach of applying the rule to any transaction
that might broadly be termed a purchase and sale, the courts began to
fashion a new approach to unorthodox transactions. 23 The subjective approach requires the court to consider the facts of the case in order to determine if the transaction presented the possibility of abuse which Congress intended to prevent. 24 If it was one open to speculative abuse of inside information, then the rule was to be applied; if not, then the case was outside
of the rule. Determination of whether the transaction was a purchase and
sale within the rule was to be made after the possibility for abuse was determined. 25 The courts using this approach are less concerned with strict
(objective) statutory application than with the intent of the rule. Since the
mid-1960's the majority of decisions have adopted this approach.
The first Supreme Court decision in this area, Reliance Electric Co. v.
Emerson Electric Co.,20 came in 1972. In a split decision, the court applied
a strict, objective interpretation of the rule to a transaction designed to limit
section 16(b) liability by splitting the sale of stock. The beneficial owners
of a corporation held 13.2 percent of the stock. Within six months of acquisition of the stock they sold 3.24 percent, and two weeks later they sold
the remaining 9.96 percent.2 7 The Supreme Court, relying on previous
cases applying the objective approach, found the beneficial owner liable only
for that portion of profits on the first sale. The Court reviewed the opera19. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Newmark
v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970); HeliCoil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1965).
20. See cases cited note 14 supra.
21. 259 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
22. The court held the transaction (an involuntary conversion) would be considered a purchase only if "the transaction is of a kind that can possibly lend itself to
the speculation encompassed by section 16(b)." 259 F.2d at 345. The court based
its holding on the premise that the conversion was involuntary, there was no chance
for speculative abuse, and, therefore, a § 16(b) purchase had not taken place.
23. For the past decade the weight of judicial authority has supported the subjective
approach to application of § 16(b). Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965). In the preceding cases the courts looked
first as to whether there was any opportunity for speculative abuse before applying
§ 16(b). See also notes 18, 19 supra, 28 infra, and accompanying text.
24. Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
854 (1970).
25. Id. at 351.
26. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
27. At the time of the second sale the owners held only 9.96,% of the stock and
were no longer "beneficial owners" under a strict reading of the statute and therefore
were not subject to § 16(b) prohibitions.
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tive facts and refused to look at the possibility of abuse inherent in the situation. Construing the statute strictly, the Court expressly found the objective
standards of the statute controlling. 28 The holding by the Supreme Court
in Reliance was heralded by many commentators as a return to the objective
approach. 29 The subsequent decision in Kern County, however, limits the
scope of application of the objective approach.
II.

KERN COUNTY LAND CO. V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP.

In Kern County Land Co. the Supreme Court explicitly chose the subjective over the objective approach to section 16(b). 30 The Court found
that "the prevailing view is to apply the statute only when its application
would serve its goal" 31 of preventing abuse of inside information. The
Court determined its duty to be to decide whether the sale within the scope
of the statute took place, either when Occidental became bound to exchange
gave
its shares of Old Kern as a result of the merger, or when Occidental
32
the option to Tenneco to purchase the Tenneco shares so acquired.
The Court repeatedly pointed out that at no time did Occidental have
access to insider information, and that in fact Old Kern vigorously opposed
Occidental's efforts to gain control. The exchange of Occidental's Old Kern
stock for Tenneco was claimed to be a "sale" under section 16(b). The
Court held that the critical fact was that the exchange took place pursuant
to a merger between Old Kern and Tenneco, 33 a merger over which Occidental had no control and which was in fact consummated to thwart Occidental's plans. The merger made the exchange irrevocable and involuntary;
Occidental could not avoid the exchange unless it sold its Old Kern stock
prior to the closing of the merger. Because this sale would clearly have
given rise to liability under section 16(b),3 4 it was not a reasonable alternative. The Court held that since the exchange was involuntary and the
merger was not engineered by Occidental, there was an absence of the
"speculative abuse of inside information," and thus section 16(b) should not
apply and no liability should arise.
The second question to be answered was whether the option agreement
between Occidental and Tenneco was a sale for purposes of section 16(b).
The Court pointed out the mutual advantages to both parties of the option
arrangement. Occidental wanted to avoid being tied into an unfavorable
minority stockholder position and Tenneco had no desire to have a "potentially troublesome minority stockholder." 33 Applying the subjective criterion
28. 404 U.S. at 422. "The only method Congress deemed effective to curb the
evils of insider trading was a flat rule taking the profits out of a class of transactions
in which the possibility of abuse was believed to be intolerably great." Id.

29. Gadsby & Treadway, supra note 13; Note, Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson
Electric Co.: A Mechanistic Application of Section 16(b), 26 Sw. L.J. 792 (1972);
Note, Reliance Electric and 16(b) Litigation: A Return to the Objective Approach?,
58 VA. L. REV. 907 (1972).
30. Id. at 594, 595 n.26.

31. Id. at 595.
32. Id.

33. Id. at 596.
34. Id. at 599.
35. Id. at 601.
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of whether the possibility of speculative abuse existed, the Court found it
did not; Occidental had given a fixed-price option under which it could not
share in a rising market, and Tenneco had the right to buy although Occidental could not force it to do so. The Court indicated that these are not
the types of arrangements or motivations that give rise to speculative abuse.
The Court pointedly mentioned that even if Occidental had inside information at the time of the option it was in respect to Old Kern, not Tenneco.3 6 Occidental had no inside information as to what the future value
of Tenneco stock would be. Moreover, the Court noted that the opinion was
not exercisable until after six months in the future and that the rule presumed any advantage that existed would dissipate by that time. The Court
also found that the premium Tenneco paid for the option was not so large
87
as to make its exercise inevitable.
Accordingly, the majority held that neither the exchange of stock nor the
option agreement were sales within the meaning of section 16(b) because
of the lack of opportunity for speculative abuse.8 8 Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that the rule should be applied strictly and not in an ad hoc
fashion. Relying on the decision in Reliance Electric and the language of
the statute itself, Douglas claimed that this transaction was clearly a sale
and that the rule does not allow any inquiry into whether there was actual
abuse of inside information. 9 Justice Douglas said, "It's one thing to interpret the terms 'purchase' and 'sale' liberally in order to include those transactions which evidence the evil Congress sought to eliminate; it is quite another to abandon the bright-line test of section 16(b) for these transactions
'40
which clearly fall within its literal bounds."
The Court rejected the traditional objective approach. That is, they refused to apply the rule to an unorthodox transaction because there was no
opportunity for abuse of inside information. But the Court did not reject
the necessity of having the objective statutory criteria set forth in the statute met before liability arose. While the Court in -this case embraced the
subjective approach to unorthodox transactions, in making this determination the Court also related the facts in the case to a strict reading of the
statute. Applying the subjective approach, the Court found that there was
no opportunity for the abuse of inside information and that the transaction
was not a sale within the meaning of section 16(b).
Reading the Kern case in conjunction with Reliance Electric, a new standard for the application of 16(b) is formed. A closer examination of Reliance shows that the subjective approach was not rejected, but rather was
not needed for a determination of the issue in that case. Because of the
orthodox nature of the transaction in Reliance Electric, the Court never arrived at the point where a subjective decision was necessary. The sales were
mere brokerage transactions, and therefore it was not necessary to employ
36. Id. at 603.
37. Id. at 596, 603, 604.
38. Id.

39. Id. at 605, 606.
40. Id. at 613.
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the subjective approach which is used when unorthodox transactions are encountered. Simply stated, the factual situation did not necessitate the use
of the subjective approach. Since the seller in Reliance was not a beneficial
owner at the time of the second sale the case did not fit the objective statutory criteria of section 16(b). 41 However, in Kern County, because the
statutory criteria of the rule were met and because of the unorthodox nature
of the transaction, the question progressed to whether the transaction was
one that was open to the speculative abuse of inside information. This was
necessary to determine whether the transaction was within the scope of section 16(b).
Taken together, Reliance Electric and Kern County exemplify the application of the two tests and affirm the subjective approach to application of
section 16(b) in unorthodox transactions. The present test for application
of section 16(b) would seem to consist of: (1) whether the transaction
was orthodox or unorthodox; if orthodox then the objective approach is applied; if the transaction is unorthodox then the following is considered; (2)
whether this transaction is one that lends itself to the possibility of unfair
use of inside information; and (3) if it does, whether it was a purchase and
sale or sale and purchase within the meaning of section 16(b). For both
orthodox and unorthodox transactions, all of the strict objective criteria of
the statute must be met before liability will arise.
The dissents in both Reliance and Kern were written by Justice Douglas,
who argues for a broad interpretation of what transactions the 16(b) rule
covers and a strict objective approach to the application of the rule. In
Reliance he would have held the seller liable by interpreting the two sales
as one for purposes of the rule, and in Kern County he would advocate strict
application of the rule regardless of the opportunity for abuse. Therefore,
applying a stricter test, Justice Douglas would have found the defendants
liable in both cases.
III.

CONCLUSION

The approach espoused by the Court allows the greatest maximum flexibility in determining whether the transaction is one which Congress intended
to prevent, while at the same time requiring that the objective statutory
criteria be met before liability can attach. While not yet entirely clear,
the Court's basic approach to the application of section 16(b) appears to
be formed. The uncertainty as to which test to apply should disappear as
the lower courts begin to apply this standard to section 16(b) cases. 4 2 The
courts will be able to combine the equity of the subjective approach with
41. 15'U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970); see note 2 supra.
42. In Gold v. Sloan, 486 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1973), the court relied on the Kern

County case in holding that an exchange of common stock pursuant to a merger does
not constitute a "purchase" for purposes of determining the applicability of § 16(b) liability when no opportunity for abuse of inside information existed. The court declared
that under Kern County the question was "not whether there was 'actual abuse of insider information' or 'intent to profit on the basis of such information.' These considerations are irrelevant.

It is specifically whether the defendant 'had or was likely to

have access to inside information, * * * so as to afford it [or him] an opportunity
to reap speculative, short-swing profits' from the unorthodox transaction."
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the prophylactic effect desired by Congress when the rule was written. Although the Kern-Reliance approach will continue to dictate liability in cases
such as Smolowe and Park & Tilford, the difference will be felt in those
unorthodox transactions where the objective criteria are met but there is no
chance for abuse. Congress has allowed the separate approaches to divide
the courts at various times without taking any legislative action. In view
of this, the Supreme Court's only choice was to take the most equitable approach available while still following the statute's basic language. If Congress is unhappy over the Supreme Court's resolution of the problems inherent in the rule, then the rule should be amended so as to define more
clearly the terms and methods of application Congress prefers. The Court
itself has twice suggested that if it has misinterpreted congressional intent
48
then Congress should dictate a different result.
George W. Tenney

43. See Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Land Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 595
(1973); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 425 (1972).

